Like many of us, I’m feeling an acute sense of unease at the way in which the Memorandum of Understanding between the US and Iran was achieved, the terms included, and those not included. I’ve read and listened to some of the analysts I respect most over the last several days, and my unease seems to be shared far beyond the confines of our community. Nonetheless, it is important to see the big picture, the tactical and strategic imperatives, the operational challenges, as well as the likely outcomes.

At the beginning of this war, at the end of February, several military objectives were set out. In the simplest sense, those objectives were achieved. Iran’s air force, navy, and long range ballistic missile array were either destroyed or heavily damaged and depleted. Iran’s industrial base for the manufacture of those missiles was almost wiped out. Its nuclear facilities were rendered even more unusable and unreachable than they were after June 2025, and the enriched uranium continues to be sealed far underground. Its air defense systems remain devastated, and a large proportion of its ruling hierarchy has been eliminated. And it has suffered an estimated $750 billion in economic damage and losses that it will have to rebuild.

In Lebanon, an already weakened Hezbollah has suffered further devastating losses of personnel, weaponry, missile arrays, and, perhaps most importantly, the volatile area (mostly) south of the Litani river from where it has attacked Israel for many years. The Lebanese government took some timid measures against Hezbollah as well, and began direct talks with Israel.

Hamas continues to be a diminishing threat as long as Israeli military pressure remains keeping it within the yellow line and without access to weapons shipments. The Houthis have stayed almost completely out of this fight.

And yet.

Iranian drone warfare both greatly damaged and scared its Gulf neighbors, even as they integrated with Israeli air defenses. And though their short and medium range ballistic missiles don’t threaten Israel, they did threaten (and impact) Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar, as well as US, French and UK bases in the region. Iranian ballistic missile fire at Israel also diminished greatly as the war went on, with a high level of accuracy from all levels of interceptors.

The vast and speedy use and depletion of those interceptors is a huge problem. They are expensive and no one has a production line that can make them as quickly as they are needed.

Hezbollah’s use of drones has changed its battlefield arithmetic as well, creating an ongoing serious tactical threat, if not the strategic one its former 150,000 missile arsenal represented.

And yet.

The Iranians were able to leverage the global oil dependency by shutting the Straits of Hormuz. The US response was correct, as closing it to Iran as well forced them to shut down oilfields, store crude oil, and even further constrain the flow of revenues that they are starved for. But they did not hold out for long enough. Iran’s Mukawama (resistance) ideology is based on leveraging the suffering of their own people to achieve their apocalyptic endgame, and they were more prepared to suffer than American and worldwide consumers were to pay more for their gas and energy.

And yet.

The way in which the US permitted the Iranian insistence on linking the Lebanon front to Iran to prevail would seem to indicate little consideration for Israel’s needs, and the multiple times Hezbollah has acted as the aggressor in this arena since 10/7. If Israelis can’t live in the North with a sense of security, how much of a victory can it be described as?

Some are suggesting there are secret side letters covering ballistic missile production and terror proxies, that will not be made public but are integral to the deal. I think this is unlikely, and points to weakness in the US negotiating position.

I understand the approach that Prime Minister Netanyahu has had in working so closely with the US to address the nuclear issue. He’s had the elimination of the Iranian nuclear threat as his highest priority since I first met him in the early 1990s. So any agreement and congruency on action with the first US administration to see it as clearly was an important opportunity, and the large majority of Israelis feel the same. And, in fact, that part of the war seems to have worked.

Regime change was hoped for but no one had a good way to achieve it, short of millions of Iranians getting mowed down in the streets by the IRGC. Cooperation with the Gulf states has limits, and those were reached, as they ran for the exits when their oil facilities were targeted.

The US President - whether this one or another - has, and has to have, the interests of the United States at the forefront. When US command authority stops, if you are an ally, no matter how close, you’ve connected yourself to those needs, not they to yours. So it is entirely understandable, though not necessarily desirable, for Israel to be meek on the terms of the deal related to Iran. The Lebanon clause is an outlier, and it may not only be another wedge with the US, but potentially the thing that PM Netanyahu can’t overcome in the upcoming Israeli elections.

There is so much to contemplate, and frankly not much of it looks positive. But there are some important things to remember.

• This demonstrates Israel’s absolute need to go the Ukrainian route and fully embrace an offensive and defensive drone strategy, as well as continuing to accelerate development of its laser defense systems first used in 2025. Israel has great advantages in the field as well as in the AI backbone that will manage its array.
• PM Netanyahu’s indication that Israel may not and perhaps should not continue to depend on US military aid (really, jobs and welfare for US states where defense industry facilities are located, because Israel must use the funds to purchase US weapons systems) is likely the right path. And the current US administration agrees.
• It follows that any US administration should be aware: An Israel that is not dependent on US aid and that is becoming self-sufficient in everything from artillery shells to Iron Dome interceptors is an Israel that is much less susceptible to US pressure. The leverage used by both republican and democrat administrations would mostly evaporate, and Israel would have a much freer hand in the future.
• Many analysts are wondering if this MOU will even get past the first stage, as Iran is unlikely to ever fully give up its nuclear aspirations, and will drag this on as they have learned to do. WIth no further US appetite for full scale war, two months from now we may be looking at an indefinite status quo where Iran has limited relief but no final deal shaking off sanctions and giving full access to funds.
• Though freedom loving Iranians will be feeling betrayed by those who are making deals with the IRGC, the structural problems in Iran won’t be fixed even by a short term influx of cash. And eventually the people will come out to the streets again, probably sooner than later.

There’s more to consider, but I’ll finish with a story that the Quixotic aspirations of the Iranian people put me in mind of. There’s an old story about a teacher who ran afoul of his king. The king sentences the teacher to death. The desperate teacher tells the king he has a brand-new trick. If the king gives the teacher his best horse for a year, he will teach the horse to talk. The king agrees. When asked later by a friend whether he really can teach the horse to talk, he says “Who knows? In a year, the king could die. I could die. Perhaps I could ride away on the horse, And maybe, just maybe, I could teach the horse to talk!”

Let’s hope that somehow, the long-suffering Iranian people can turn a year of ashes and mourning into a year of joy and freedom.